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in the media 'seek to extinguish ... free speech rights' 
... Nice try. But infomercials are advertisements." 
Commercial Alert quoted CBS chairman Leslie 
Moonves in 2003: "I saw 'Minority Report,' Steven 
Spielberg's movie - that had more product placement 
than any TV show I've ever seen. So my phrase is, 'If 
it's good enough for Spielberg, it's good enough for us.' 
So you're going to see more and more of that ... instead 
of Ray Romano sitting there with a can of nondescript 
soda, he'll be drinking a Diet Pepsi." 
The aai Column 
What do exit polls and flu vaccine 
shortages have in common? 
Albert A. Foer, Robert Lande, & EM. Scherer* 
In 2004, exit polls failed to predict and analyze prop-
erly the outcome of the presidential election. Also in 
2004, the inability of one company to deliver flu vac-
cine supplies left a substantial portion of U.S. citizens 
at risk this winter. Were these events simply unrelated 
examples of mistakes and bad luck? More likely, they 
reflect an increasingly serious problem lurking behind 
our national economic policy: dismissal of the value of 
diversity. 
Diverse, competing voices in mainstream broadcast 
media are critical for a vibrant, healthy and well-in-
formed U.S. democracy. Yet on three important occa-
sions, the major media combined their exit polling op-
erations into one organization that had spectacular fail-
ures. The Voter News Service (VNS) was a joint ven-
ture between five major TV news organizations -- ABC, 
CBS, NBC, Fox, and CNN, and the Associated Press 
designed to produce and analyze electi<'Hl exit polling 
information. It was the only national firm that compiled 
polling data taken as voters left voting booths. 
Until the 1988 election, the major news organiza-
tions did their own exit polling and made their election 
predictions independently. As a cost saving measure, 
in the early 1990s they combined their operations, and 
since then all have relied on a single joint venture to 
produce the same data and models, rather than compet-
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ing to predict election results most accurately . 
Relying on the Voter News Service's infOlmation in 
2000, the networks first called the election in favor of 
Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., a few hours later called 
it for George W. Bush and finally admitted that neither 
candidate had clearly prevailed. 
Despite criticisms by the American Antitrust Insti-
tute and others, the major newsgathering organizations 
decided to keep their exit polling operations together. 
During the 2002 elections the new VNS computer 
system failed to work properly. Although the networks 
were spared from televised embarrassment in 2002, the 
malfunctioning VNS again deprived the public of accu-
rate exit poll electoral analysis. 
In 2004, the name of the exit poll joint venture was 
changed to the "National Election Pool", but it was 
the same six companies in the same monopoly bed. 
Although this time they utilized two respected polling 
companies, there still was no competition in exit poll-
ing, and they relied upon only one source the As-
sociated Press - for vote tallying. The polling results 
again were misleading and distorted. As Gary Langer, 
director of polling for ABC News, afterwards wrote: "A 
poorly devised exit poll question and a dose of spin are 
threatening to undermine our understanding of the 2004 
presidential election." The monopoly approach was no 
doubt "efficient" since it saved the news media money. 
But it was dramatically inefficient in terms of its use-
fulness for political reporting and analysis. 
A parallel situation occurred in the market for flu 
vaccines. Only two companies Chiron and Aventis-
Pasteur - were contracted to supply influenza vaccine. 
But Chiron's plant developed contamination problems 
and Aventis-Pasteur was unable significantly to in-
crease production beyond its planned output, causing 
stringent rationing of vaccine. 
As was the case with the malfunctioning exit polls, 
this had happened many times before. Immunization 
programs in the U.S. have repeatedly experienced vac-
cine production failures that have led to shortages, ra-
tioning, and black markets. These have been caused by 
many specific events over the years, but at the core the 
problem has always been that only a small number of 
~nlls have produced any given vaccine. This virtually 
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guaranteed that a significant problem with the produc-
tion of any supplier would precipitate large shortfalls 
and rationing. 
There have been many reasons why we have relied 
on such a small number of producers. In addition to 
cost savings, mergers, liability risks, relatively small 
markets, and government policies (or their absence) 
have apparently played a role. Regardless of the cause, 
once one company's flu vaccine production has failed, 
it is too late for the others to produce enough. If there 
had been many producers, however, the failure of one 
would probably not have made a large difference. 
The exit polling and flu vaccine examples show how 
our society is placed at risk by policies that favor ex-
cessively high levels of market concentration. Today's 
almost laissezjaire approach shows that competition 
policy has traveled a long way from the 1960's, when 
antitl1lst too often protected specific competitors in-
stead of the competitive process. But now the pendu-
lum has swung too far in the other direction. "Efficien-
cy" is the misdirected mantra of today's competition 
policy, even when it leads to unduly high levels of eco-
nomic concentration. The better policy would be for the 
government to take whatever steps are needed to assure 
that production is not limited to a monopoly or a small 
handful of producers. Sometimes one can carry all the 
eggs in one basket without tripping. But when tripping 
occurs there is nothing efficient about the results. 
Albert A. Foer is President of the American Antitrust Insti-
tute. Robert H. Lande is Venable Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Baltimore. EM. Scherer is Aetna Professor Emeritus, 
Harvard University Kennedy School of Government. For 
additional material on the topics covered, visit and search in 
the American Antitrust Institute's archives at <http://www.un 
titrustinstitllte.orgi> for "exit polls" and/or "flu vaccine." 
Contact: Bert Foer, 202-276-6002, 
bfber@untitrustinslitute.Qrg 
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Briefs 
President Bush's proposed budgets for the FTC 
and the Justice Dept. 's Antitrust Division in FY 2006 
(commencing October 1), anticipate funding the 
agencies at "current services" levels. Meaning that. 
factoring in inflation, they are neither increased nor 
decreased. The FTC's allocation, $211 million is offset 
by anticipated income from Hart-Scott-Rodino filing 
fees of $116 million and $23 million from Do-Not-
Call List registrations, leaving the cost to taxpayers at 
approximately $72 million. 
Slotting fees, Middle East division: According to an 
account in an electronic antitrust newsletter distributed 
by Sheppard Mullin (D.C.) on February 7, "On January 
5, Israeli Antitl1lst Authority General Director Dror 
Stl1lm announced the finalization of 11l1es that prohibit, 
among other things, slotting allowances and category 
captaincy arrangements between large retailers and 
suppliers. Mr. Strum originally announced these 11lles 
in May 2003, but had provided time for industry to 
appeaL" <http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/> 
Zoloflbottleneck: Continuing to oppose 
pharmaceutical company delays in Hatch-Waxman 
Act filings, the FTC has filed an amicus curiae brief 
in Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Pfizer. The FTC brief 
supports Teva's petition for a declaratory judgment 
against Pfizer. Hatch-Waxman rules prescribe a rigid 
time and event schedule for introduction of new 
generic dl1lgs, but Teva (and the FTC) say that Pfizer 
created a "bottleneck" in the schedule by not suing 
Teva according to that schedule. That bottleneck 
slowed Teva's introduction of a generic version of 
Pfizer's blockbuster Zoloft, the FTC said. Lower courts 
held there was no "actual controversy," but the FTC 
said Pfizer's inaction "just as surely delays Teva from 
receiving FDA approval to market a product" as if 
Pfizer had sued Teva. The filing is John Graubert's first 
amicus as Acting General Counsel: another signatory 
on the FTC's brief is Lore Unt, FrC Counsel for 
Intellectual Property. (FrC Press Release, Feb. 11; FrC 
File No. P042112; contact Lawrence DeMille-Wagman. 
202-326-2448) 
Box office antitrust: A recent paper wonders why, 
since the 1970's. at any given movie theatre, one 
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